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I. INTRODUCTION
N APPROXIMATELY 2008, MAJOR U.S. airlines began "un-
bundling" their costs and charging separately for what was
previously the full price of an airline ticket.' Discount airlines,
like Allegiant Air and Spirit, are a growing trend for air trav-
elers, but keeping the low base fee comes at the expense of
many ancillary fees, a frequently published concern of travelers.2
Indeed, a recent survey by the U.S. Travel Association found
that 26% of passengers cited fees imposed by airlines for
checked bags, seat assignments, and other ancillary services as
their number one concern while traveling.3 In a survey by Open
Allies for Airfare Transparency, 81% of travelers surveyed view
airline practices on ancillary fees as unfair and deceptive and
71% believe airlines should have to sell ancillary services wher-
ever they sell tickets.
4
Ancillary fees are add-Qn fees to the base fare of a plane ticket
that are imposed on different optional services, including
checked and carry-on bags, meals, blankets, early boarding, and
seat selection.5 For example, airlines commonly charge around
1 Paul M. Ruden & Kevin Mitchell, The Airline Market Is Not Working, BUSINESS
TRAVEL COALITION (Sept. 8, 2014), http://businesstravelcoalition.com/cgi-bin/
dada/mail.cgi/archive/SAT/20140907082821/.
2 John Matarese, Airlines Play the Grinch with New Add-on Fees, ABC ACTION NEWS
(Dec. 16, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://www.abcactionnews.com/news/national/air
planes-play-the-grinch-with-new-add-on-fees.
3 Survey: Flying Hassles Keep Travelers at Home, U.S. TRAVEL ASS'N (June 17,
2014), https://www.ustravel.org/news/press-releases/survey-flying-hassles-keep-
travelers-home.
4 Open Allies Survey: Consumers Demand Ability to Search, Compare, and Purchase
Ancillay Fees, OPEN ALLIES FOR AIRFARE TRANSPARENCY (Sept. 4, 2014), http://
www.faretransparency.org/open-allies-survey-consumers-demand-ability-to-search
-compare-and-purchase-ancillary-fees.
5 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-515, AIRLINE COMPETITION: THE
AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMPETITORS IN MARKETS SERVING THE MAJORITY OF PASSEN-
GERS HAS CHANGED LITTLE IN RECENT YEARS, BUT STAKEHOLDERS VOICE CONCERN
ABOUT COMPETITION 34 (2014) [hereinafter AIRLINE COMPETITION].
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$25 for checking a bag.6 Discount airlines especially rely on
these ancillary fees as a substantial portion of their operating
revenue.7 Ancillary fees have been a critical component to the
recent upturn in the airline industry.' Between 2007 and 2013,
baggage fee revenues increased from $464 million to $3.35 bil-
lion, and reservation change fee revenues increased from $915
million to $2.8 billion.9
To address this conspicuous issue of airline ancillary fees, the
Department of Transportation (DOT) published a notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) entitled Transparency of Airline
Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Issues in May 2014.10
This paper will discuss the authority of the DOT to enforce the
rules in the NPRM as well as other recent rules enacted by the
DOT that have paved the way for consumer protection issues
and regulation in the airline industry. Then, it will summarize
the contents of the NPRM as well as some noteworthy comments
filed in response to the NPRM. Finally, it will examine the eco-
nomic impacts of airline ancillary fees and argue the existence
of a market incentive for the airline industry to increase trans-
parency of ancillary fees, rendering the regulatory proposal
premature.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 gave the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) authority to regulate interstate affairs and certain
deceptive trade practices.'" During this time, the federal govern-
ment had the power to regulate the price of airfare, airline
routes, and take administrative action against deceptive prac-
6 U.S. Airlines Rake in $6B in Add-on Fees, CBC NEWS (May 14, 2013, 12:46 PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/u-s-airlines-rake-in-6b-in-add-on-fees-1.13566
32.
7 AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 17.
8 Id.
9 Global Bus. Travel Ass'n, Comment Letter on Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing on the Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protec-
tion Issues (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.gbta.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/
PublicRelations/GBTATransparency-ofAncillaryees_9_29_14.pdf.
10 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,970 (proposed May 23, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
234, 244, 250, 255, 256, 257, 259, 399).
n' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1988)); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
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tices of airlines.' 2 For instance, the CAB had the authority to
regulate any air transportation rates to be 'just and reasona-
ble."' 3 In 1978, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA) because "maximum reliance on competitive market
forces would best further efficiency, innovation, and low prices
as well as variety and quality of air transportation services."14 As a
result of deregulation of the industry, the CAB was abolished in
1985 and the authority to regulate the airline industry was trans-
ferred to the DOT and narrowed. 15 However, the ADA did re-
tain the CAB's authority over deceptive trade practices.' 6
The DOT uses its authority under the unfair and deceptive
practices provision in 49 U.S.C. § 41712 to regulate aspects of
the airline industry, which affirms that the DOT may prohibit
"unfair or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competi-
tion in air transportation or the sale of air transportation."' 7 A
practice is deceptive if it is "likely to mislead" a reasonable con-
sumer.' Further, a CAB rulemaking, determining that bias in
airline-owned computer reservation systems constituted an un-
fair and deceptive practice, clarified that a practice is unlawful
under the provision if: "(1) it causes substantial consumer in-
jury, (2) that is not outweighed by any consumer or competitive
benefits from the conduct, and (3) the injury cannot reasonably
be avoided by consumers."'19
The concept of deregulation under the ADA is still a guiding
principle that is often at odds with DOT regulations in the air-
line industry for consumer protection. The Supreme Court ar-
12 Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 408 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
13 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1970).
14 Morales, 504 U.S. at 378 (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1302(a) (4), 1302(a) (9)
(1980)).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 379.
17 49 U.S.C. § 41712(a) (2006).
18 Sw. Sunsites, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir.
1986); see also Airlines for America, Comment Letter on the Disclosure of Certain
Ancillary Fee Information to Consumers, at 6 (Sept. 29, 2014), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2014-0056-0726 [hereinaf-
ter A4A Comment].
19 Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540, 32,547
(Aug. 15, 1984) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255 (2004)); see International Air Trans-
port Association, Comment on the Department of Transportation (DOT) Pro-
posed Rule: Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer
Protection Issues, at 6-8 (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!docu
mentDetail;DDOT-OST-2014-0056-0713 [hereinafter IATA Comment].
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ticulated the intent of the ADA in Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg,
holding that "[t] he ADA is based on the view that the best inter-
ests of airline passengers are most effectively promoted, in the
main, by allowing the free market to operate. '20 The DOT has
acknowledged limitations on its authority due to the ADA's der-
egulatory intent: "Our rules are designed to produce the mini-
mum intervention necessary to prevent the abuses we detect."2 1
Further, the DOT has stated that the marketplace must govern
airfares and issues relating to airfares unless there is "compel-
ling evidence of consumer deception or unfair methods of
competition. 22
B. RECENT DOT RULES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION
The DOT has generally used its authority restrictedly to regu-
late the airline industry by prohibiting unfair or deceptive prac-
tices.2' However, recently the DOT has adopted rules and
proposals in favor of broad consumer protection.24 In early
2014, the DOT implicated § 41712 by proposing to regulate con-
sumer cell phone use during flights because their use may lead
to uncomfortable noise levels for fellow passengers.25 The
NPRM that is the focus of this paper, Transparency of Airlines An-
cillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Issues, is the third in a
series. 26 In 2009, the first rule, Enhanced Protections for Airline Pas-
sengers I, increased penalties for long tarmac delays.27 In this
20 Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1433 (2014); see also IATA Com-
ment, supra note 19.
21 Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 32,533.
22 Petition for Rulemaking ofJoel Kaufman Re Ticket Change Penalties, Order
2003-3-11, at 1 (D.O.T Mar. 18, 2003), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/
dot.gov/files/docs/2003-3-1 1.pdf.
23 Joanne W. Young & Lyndsey M. Grunewald, Supreme Court Review of DOT
Actions: An Opportunity to Discipline Government Efforts to Re-Regulate the Industry, 25
No. 4 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 14 (2013).
24 Id.
25 Use of Mobile Wireless Devices for Voice Calls on Aircraft, 79 Fed. Reg.
10,049, 10,050-51 (proposed Feb. 24, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R pt. 251);
see also Open Allies for Airfare Transparency, Comment on the DOT Proposed
Rule: Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, at 59 (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=
DOT-OST-2014-0056-0723 [hereinafter Open Allies Comment].
26 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,970 (proposed May 23, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
234, 244, 250, 255, 256, 257, 259, 399).
27 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,983, 68,993 (Dec.
30, 2009) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 259.4 (2011)); see Bart Jansen, DOT Rule to
Require Airlines to Better Disclose Fees, USA TODAY (May 21, 2014), http://
7532015]
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rule, the DOT found that chronically delayed flights constitute
an unfair and deceptive practice.28 It also required airlines to
post flight delay information on their website and implement
customer service plans. 29 The second rule, Enhanced Protections
for Airline Passengers II, published in 2011, required airlines to
have minimum customer service standards, called for more
transparency of ancillary fees on the airline's website, and pro-
hibited price increases after purchase. 0 Specifically, it required
airlines to disclose ancillary fee information on their websites
and include information about baggage services and fees on
their e-ticket confirmation.'Additionally, in this second rule,
the DOT issued regulations on airline marketing and ticket pric-
ing called the airfare advertising rule. 2 This section will cover
two issues contained in the two DOT rules: the tarmac delay rule
and the total-price rule.
1. Tarmac Delay Rule
The three-hour tarmac delay rule requires airplanes to allow
passengers to return to the gate if they have been on the tarmac
for over three hours.33 The fines for noncompliance could be as
high as $27,500 per passenger. 4 It also requires the airlines to
provide water and food and maintain lavatories for passengers
within two hours of the delayed flight." However, some research
shows that this rule has had a negative effect on consumer expe-
rience. 6 It may lead airlines to cancel flights due to a fear of
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/21/dot-airlines-consumer-rules-
checked-bag-fees-carry-on-mishandled-late/9367469/.
28 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,993.
29 Id. at 68,983.
30 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110 (Apr. 25,
2011) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 244, 250, 253, 259, 399 (2012)).
31 RACHEL TANG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43078, AIRLINE PASSENGER RIGHTS:
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN AVIATION CONSUMER PROTECTION 14 (2013), http://
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43078.pdf.
32 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 23,166 (amending
14 C.F.R. § 399.84(a)).
33 14 C.F.R. § 259.4 (2011).
34 Marnie Hunter, DOT Plans "Strong Enforcement"for Tarmac Delay Rule, CNN
(Apr. 27, 2014, 4:16 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/04/27/
tarmac.delays/.
35 New DOT Consumer Rule Limits Airline Tarmac Delays, Provides Other Passenger
Protections, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANS. (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.dot.gov/briefing-
room/new-dot-consumer-rule-limits-airline-tarmac-delays-provides-other-passen
ger.
36 Alan Levin, Tarmac Delay Rule Making U.S. Flight Cancellations More Likely,
GAO Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011, 5:10 PM), http://www.bloom
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paying the hefty fineY. A study by the Government Accountabil-
ity Office found that airlines experienced a 24% increase in the
odds of cancelling a flight after the rule went into effect.3 8
2. Total-Price Rule
Beginning in 1984, the DOT has required that the advertised
price for airfare include the entire price .s However, airlines
could separate the base airfare from the tax, so that customers
would have to add them to decipher the total price. 40 But the
airfare advertising rule changed this with the inclusion of the
total-price rule, which required airline advertisements to mini-
mize reference to government taxes and fees.4 The airlines can
still give an itemized breakdown of the fare, but the price com-
ponents cannot be displayed prominently or in the same size as
the total price.42 Opponents of the rule believe it works against
First Amendment rights and prevents a healthy and competitive
airline industry.43 Spirit Airlines sued unsuccessfully over the
rule.44
Airlines have reacted to the total-price rule by lobbying for
the Transparent Airfares Act of 2014,45 which recently passed
through the House of Representatives.46 The Act would allow
berg.com/news/2011-09-14/tarmac-delay-rule-making-u-s-flight-cancellations-
more-likely-gao-says.html.
37 Margaret Jasper, Proposed Rules Provide Protection for Airline Passengers, LAW-
YERS.COM, http://government.lawyers.com/proposed-rules-provide-protection-
for-airline-passengers.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
38 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-733, AIRLINE PASSENGER PRO-
TECTIONS: MORE DATA AND ANALYSIS NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND EFFECTS OF FLIGHT
DELAYS (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/322962.pdf; see also Levin, supra
note 36.
39 Statements of General Policy, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,440 (Dec. 20, 1984) (codified
as amended at 14 C.F.R. § 399.84(a)).
40 Id.; Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 408 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
41 14 C.F.R. § 399.84(a) ("Although charges included within the single total
price listed (e.g., government taxes) may be stated separately or through links or
'pop ups' on websites that display the total price, such charges may not be false or
misleading, may not be displayed prominently, may not be presented in the same
or larger size as the total price, and must provide cost information on a per pas-
senger basis that accurately reflects the cost of the item covered by the charge.").
42 Id.; Spirit Airlines, 687 F.3d at 409.
43 SeeYoung & Grunewald, supra note 23, at 1, 15.
4 See Spirit Airlines, 687 F.3d. at 403.
45 H.R. 4156, 113th Cong. (2014).
46 Christopher Elliot, Fliers Say Bill Will Give Airlines License to Lie About Fare,
USA TODAY (Apr. 24, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/
flights/2014/04/21 / transparent-airfares-act-airline-ticket-tax/7956227/.
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airlines to list the government taxes and fees separate from the
full price of the airfare.47 The incentive for airlines to want to
pass on the blame for high airfare is evident-an estimated 20%
of a total airline ticket price goes to federal taxes and fees.4"
Airlines argue that the bill furthers consumer interest by letting
them know where their money is going, whereas consumer
groups oppose the bill, insisting that it is another opportunity
for airlines to deceive consumers by advertising a lower base fare
than the actual cost. 49
III. TRANSPARENCY OF ANCILLARY AIRLINE FEES AND
OTHER CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES
A. WHAT IS IN THE NPRM?
In May 2014, the DOT published its Transparency of Airline An-
cillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Issues NPRM.5 ° In the
NPRM, the DOT avers that some people cannot calculate the
true cost of travel, because of insufficient information about an-
cillary services and fees, such as carry-on bags, checked bags,
and seat reservations. 51 To combat this, the DOT suggests
changing the definition of "ticket agent" to broaden regulation,
requiring airlines to provide information on ancillary fees and
ticket agents to disclose this information, and promulgating
other rules designed to increase consumer protection for pur-
chasers of airline tickets. 52
1. Definition of "Ticket Agent"
Due to the growing popularity of ticket booking through
meta-search engines, the proposal sets forth a new definition of
"ticket agent. '' 53 This is "to ensure that its consumer protection
regulations apply to all entities that hold out airfare, schedule,
47 Press Release, Jim Billimoria & Justin Harclerode, Transparent Airfares Act
Introduced in the House, Trans. and Infrastructure Comm. (Mar. 6, 2014),
http://transportation.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=371951.
48 Elliot, supra note 46.
49 Id.
50 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,970 (proposed May 23, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
234, 244, 250, 255, 256, 257, 259, 399).
51 Id. at 29,970.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 29,972-74.
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and availability information to consumers. '54 The definition
would include entities involved in the sale of transportation
through the Internet regardless of whether they sell tickets
themselves. 55 Specifically, the proposal will cause meta-search
engine websites such as Kayak and Google to be considered
ticket agents and thus fall under the department's new con-
sumer protection requirements. 56 Meta-search engines typically
provide flight information for consumers to research flight
schedules and fare, but then these websites connect them to the
airline or travel agent website to purchase their tickets. 57 The
proposed definition would ensure that websites with flight
search tools are subject to the consumer protection regulations
and that they give consumers information about ancillary fees
early in the transaction.58
2. Transparency
The proposed rules would require airlines to provide ticket
agents, possibly including Global Distribution Systems (GDSs),
with information on core ancillary fees and services. 59 GDSs sup-
ply the ticket agents with information on the fare, availability,
and schedule of the airlines.60 Sabre, TravelPort, and Amadeus
are the three GDSs in the United States that control the distri-
bution of most airline services.61 Most airlines use GDSs to dis-
tribute their products, but some, like Southwest, do not, most
likely to avoid the extra service fees.6 2 The airlines pay a booking
fee to the GDS at a price that currently frustrates the airlines.6
GDSs have long-term contract agreements with both the airlines
and travel agents that act as a barrier to entry for travel technol-
ogy firms.64 The NPRM puts forth two different options for the
rule requiring disclosure of ancillary fees: option A and option
B.6 5 Option A would require airlines to disclose ancillary fee in-
formation to all ticket agents, including GDSs that the airline
54 Id. at 29,972.
55 Id. at 29,973.
56 Id. at 29,974.
57 Id. at 29,973.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 29,977-78.
60 Id. at 29,975-76.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 29,976.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 29,976.
65 Id. at 30,000-02.
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permits to distribute its services information.66 Option B would
not require airlines to disclose ancillary fee information to GDSs
and other intermediaries, but instead only to those ticket agents
that sell tickets directly to consumers.6 7 Option B would also not
require airlines to disclose ancillary fee information to meta-
search engines like Kayak and Google.6 s
The proposal states that not all ancillary service fee informa-
tion needs to be disclosed, but disclosures must include those
services that are viewed as "intrinsic to air transportation. 69
These services include first and second checked baggage, one
carry-on item, and advance seat selection. 70 The airlines would
have to give this information to ticket agents, and the carriers
and ticket agents would be required to disclose this information
before the customer purchases the ticket.7' However, the NPRM
requests comments on whether the list of intrinsic services
should be expanded to include in-flight wi-fi, seating section up-
grades, food and beverages, and priority boarding. 72
In addition to transparency, the proposal solicits comments
on whether the ancillary services should be "transactable," which
means that the ancillary services could be bought at the same
time as the initial purchase of the airfare. 73 If the rule required
ancillary services to be transactable, then they must be made
available for purchase through every channel selling their tick-
ets. 74 Transactability would alleviate concerns for consumers
such as whether airlines will increase the price when the ancil-
lary service is actually purchased, and the continued availability
of certain services such as advanced seat assignments. 75 Pricing
for advanced seat assignments are of particular interest with re-
spect to transactability because prices are inconsistent, changing
with availability, time of purchase, and aircraft size.7 6





71 Id. at 29,977-78.
72 Id. at 29,980.






3. Other Rules in the NPRM
The proposal sets forth additional rules to increase passenger
protection.77 Under the proposal, small airlines, like Spirit,
would be required to report their on-time performance data.78
This is because the proposal would require any airline account-
ing for at least .5% of the domestic scheduled passenger reve-
nue to report that data, as opposed to the current 1%
requirement. 79 As a reporting carrier, an airline must disclose to
consumers the on-time performance per flight either by phone
or in person upon reasonable inquiry.80 Airlines are also re-
quired to report on-time performance data and mishandled bag-
gage information to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.81
The DOT believes this will incentivize smaller airlines to provide
quality customer service.82 The NPRM also contains a rule that
will require airlines to report data for flights operated by code-
share partners.8 3 The DOT provides quality of service informa-
tion through the Air Travel Consumer Report, including flight
delays, oversales, mishandled baggage, and consumer com-
plaints.8 4 The report has a significant impact on consumer per-
ception of the airline, so its accuracy is vital for consumer
transparency and airline competition. 5 Code-share flights are
those regional short-haul flights operated on a fee-for-flight ba-
sis by an operating carrier partner, but the operating carrier
does not market or sell the tickets.8 6 Mainline carriers often
market the flight with their own brands and handle all customer
service aspects of their code-share flights.8 7 The DOT hopes that
this rule will make the report a more complete and accurate
representation of airlines' quality of service.88
77 Id.
78 Katia Hetter, Feds to Require More Transparency in Airlines Fees, CNN (May 21,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/21/travel/new-airline-ticket-agent-rules/.
- Compare Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protec-
tion Issues, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29,981, with 14 C.F.R. § 234.2.
80 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29,980.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 29,981.
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The proposal aims to regulate ticket agencies to protect the
growing number of consumers who primarily book through
ticket agencies. Certain customer service standards that cur-
rently apply only to airlines would extend to ticket agents, such
as allowing customers to hold reservations without payment or
cancel without penalty for twenty-four hours provided that the
reservation is made at least a week before the departure date.89
An agency's website would have to disclose its cancellation pol-
icy to consumers and promptly inform passengers of changes in
their travel itinerary.9
0
At least one of the rules in the NPRM benefits airlines and is
supported by airlines. Under current regulations, air carriers are
prohibited from increasing the price of ancillary fees after the
purchase of a ticket, including but not limited to the price of a
seat and baggage fees.9' The proposal modifies this rule to only
prohibit airlines from increasing the baggage fee after purchase
of a ticket but allows increases for other ancillary fees, since bag-
gage fees are "intrinsic to air transportation" and applying the
prohibition to other fees may be logistically unfeasible.92
Many of the proposed rules are designed to increase trans-
parency to consumers online. Indeed, airlines and ticket agents
must disclose any code-sharing arrangements on initial itinerary
displays on their websites For example, a United Airlines
flight that includes a regional carrier flight would need to iden-
tify the regional carrier.94 The proposal considers requiring
ticket agents that give preference to certain carriers over others
either to disclose that preference or provide unbiased displays.95
Websites of large travel agents must disclose in their online dis-
plays if they do not market all of the air carriers available to the
consumer.
96
89 Id. at 29,984; see 14 C.F.R. § 259.5; Hetter, supra note 78.
90 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29,985.
91 14 C.F.R. § 399.88; see id. at 29,990.
92 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29,990.
93 Id. at 29,986-87; see Hetter, supra note 78.
94 Hetter, supra note 78.
95 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29,989; see Hetter, supra note 78.
96 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29,988.
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B. ARGUMENTS FOR THE PROPOSAL
Foreseeably, groups representing travel agencies, GDSs, and
consumers support most aspects of the NPRM.9 7 Many of these
groups have submitted comments to the NPRM, arguing that
prompt action is needed to address the transparency of ancillary
fees to facilitate consumer choice and airline competition, but
most of the commenters also maintain that the NPRM as it
stands is insufficient to solve the problem.98 This section will dis-
cuss the comments of the American Society of Travel Agents
(ASTA), the Travel Technology Association (TTA), Open Allies
for Airline Transparency (Open Allies), and Southwest Airlines
(Southwest).
1. The American Society of Travel Agents
The ASTA submitted a comment to the NPRM supporting the
need for improved transparency of ancillary fees, but it argued
that the NPRM does not go far enough.99 The ASTA is the larg-
est association of travel professionals worldwide and comprises
80% of the travel agency distribution channel in the United
States. °° The ASTA argues in its comment that preventing un-
fair and deceptive practices is a critical aspect of deregulating
the airline industry."' In making this point, the ASTA empha-
sizes that the DOT is the sole enforcement authority for con-
97 Michele McDonald, Response to DOT's Proposed Rule Falls Along Predictable
Lines, TRAVEL MARKET REPORT (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.travelmarketreport.
com/articles/Response-to-DOTs-Proposed-Rules-Falls-Along-Predictable-Lines.
98 See American Society of Travel Agents, Comment on the DOT Proposed
Rule: Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-
OST-2014-0056-0729 [hereinafter ASTA Comment]; Travel Technology Associa-
tion, Comment on the DOT Proposed Rule: Transparency of Airline Ancillary
Fees and Other Consumer Protection Issues (Sept. 29, 2014), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2014-0056-0715 [hereinaf-
ter TTA Comment]; Open Allies Comment, supra note 25; Southwest Airlines,
Comment on the DOT Proposed Rule: Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees
and Other Consumer Protection Issues (Sept. 29, 2014), http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2014-0056-0743 [hereinaf-
ter Southwest Airlines Comment].
99 ASTA Comment, supra note 98; see McDonald, supra note 97.
100 About ASTA, ASTA, http://www.asta.org/About/index.cfm?navltemNum
ber=11164 (last visited Nov. 18, 2015); Jennifer Michels, ASTA Callsfor Immediate
Action by DOT on Airline Ancillary Fee Transparency/Transactability, ASTA (Sept. 29,
2014), http://www.asta.org/News/PRDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=12567&navltem
Number=539.
101 ASTA Comment, supra note 98, at 6.
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sumer protection against airlines. 10 2 In opposing option B of the
NPRM, the comment pleads for the DOT to require airlines to
distribute ancillary information to GDSs, in part because of the
heavy reliance by travel agents on GSDs.'0° It wants the proposal
to require airlines to allow ticket agents to sell the airlines' ancil-
lary services-that they be transactable. 1°4 It does not believe
that airlines will have any incentive to negotiate transactability of
ancillary fees with travel agents.105 The ASTA thinks making the
ancillary fee transactable is the "best solution" because it will
simplify the process for consumers and allow them to effectively
comparison shop.0 6 The comment calls on the DOT to act
swiftly to adopt rules requiring transparency and transactability
of ancillary fees and separate these issues from the other rules in
the proposal, which the ASTA opines can be addressed at a later
time.'0 7
2. The Travel Technology Association
Similar to ASTA, the TTA's comment generally supports the
proposition of increasing transparency of ancillary fees but ad-
vocates for transactability and a broader definition of "basic an-
cillary services."'10 The TTA represents the GDSs, online travel
agencies, and the meta-search engine websites that provide air
travel information. 10 9 In support of option A, it urges the DOT
to require airlines to provide the ancillary fee information to
GDSs." 0 Without this requirement, the TTA insists that the dis-
closure burden for agents would be too difficult a task, since
many agents rely on getting their information through a GDS. 1 '
In addition, the TTA supports a transactability requirement and
wants the DOT to require airlines to give ticket agents enough
information to give customer-specific quotes, not just itinerary-
specific. 1 2 Customer-specific quotes would be specific to any
particular passenger type affecting the fee, including military
102 Id.
103 Id. at 16.
104 Id. at 26.
105 Id. at 27.
106 Id. at 38.
107 Id. at 76.
108 TrA Comment, supra note 98, at 1.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 7.
III Id. at 2.
112 Id. at 20.
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personnel, frequent flyer status, method of payment, and cabin
(first class or economy). 113
In its comment, the TTA suggests that the DOT expand the
scope of "basic ancillary services" to include boarding services
and cancellation and change fees.'14 It argues that boarding ser-
vices should be included because they used to be a component
of the total ticket price, and some people, such as those with
disabilities and young children, consider them a necessity." 5 Re-
garding cancellation and change fees, the TTA cites the general
practice that airlines provide this information to ticket agents
without a regulatory requirement to show that the fees are an
important component of the base fare." 6 However, the TTA dis-
approves of the rule included in the NPRM that requires agents
to disclose any biases in their website displays and that holds
agencies to certain customer service standards. 17 To this point,
the TTA argues that ticket agents have a greater incentive to
ensure quality customer service as evidenced by fewer consumer
complaints than the airlines.1 1 8
3. Open Allies for Airline Transparency
Open Allies for Airline Transparency (Open Allies) made sim-
ilar comments and stressed that airlines lack any commercial in-
centive to provide ancillary fee information to the travel
agency."' Open Allies represents travel industry and consumer
groups who promote increased transparency of airline fares and
fees.' 20 It argues that the lack of transparency of ancillary fees
afforded to consumers constitutes a market failure.' 21 Open Al-
lies supported the claim that the ancillary fees are deceptive
with its own survey showing that out of 1,162 U.S. adult airline
travelers, 55% said they were surprised by additional fees paid
after their initial ticket purchase. 22 In its comment, Open Allies
claims that no market incentive exists for airlines to disclose an-
113 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,970, 29,978 (proposed May 23, 2014) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. pt. 234, 244, 250, 255, 256, 257, 259, 399).
114 TTA Comment, supra note 98, at 17.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 2.
118 Id. at 3.
119 See Open Allies Comment, supra note 25.
120 Id. at 1.
121 Id. at 2.
122 Id.
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cillary fee information to ticket agents: "Showing incomplete
prices undoubtedly does make air travel seem cheaper, thereby
increasing the likelihood that air travelers will purchase a ticket.
Hiding fees also degrades comparison shopping, lessening com-
petition and reducing downward pressure on prices."' 23 Like
TTA and ASTA, Open Allies supports option A and the tran-
sactability requirement and argues that ticket agents should be
provided with customer-specific fee information. 124 Also, Open
Allies takes the position that priority boarding and cancellation
and change fees should be included in the definition of "basic
ancillary services," contending that these fees are pivotal infor-
mation to consumers when comparing ticket purchase
options. 125
4. Southwest Airlines
Southwest distinguished itself from other airlines by generally
supporting the proposal. 126 In its comment, Southwest argues
that the rule requiring disclosure of basic ancillary fee informa-
tion to ticket agents "would allow consumers to make more of
an apples-to-apples comparison among carriers when shopping
for air transportation, and would foster more vigorous competi-
tion among air carriers."'' 27 This requirement would "ultimately
put downward pressure on fees.' 1 28 Southwest notes its unique-
ness among its competitors because it does not charge ancillary
fees for services intrinsic to air travel. 129 It also recognizes option
A as the better option in the NPRM for two reasons: (1) ancillary
fee information through GDSs is critical for travel agents, and
(2) ancillary fee information through meta-search engine tools
is of growing importance to consumers.' However, Southwest
does not support expanding the list of basic ancillary fees to in-
clude in-flight wi-fi, seating section upgrades, priority boarding,
or food and beverages.'
123 Id. at 6.
124 Id. at 12, 48.
125 Id. at 46.
126 Southwest Airlines Comment, supra note 98.
127 Id. at 6.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 3.
130 Id. at 9.
131 Id. at 11.
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C. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PROPOSAL
Most airlines oppose the rule, arguing that it would be an
overreach of the DOT's authority after deregulation and that
the DOT should let the marketplace rule. 3 2 This section will
discuss the comments of Airlines for America (A4A), the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA), and AAA.
1. Airlines for America
A4A argued in its comment that the ancillary fee disclosure
rule is unnecessary and beyond the DOT's regulatory author-ity.13 3 A4A is the largest trade association for airlines in the
United States. 134 A4A claims this proposal, if enacted, would be
a "dramatic change in position" from the DOT's decision to der-
egulate in 2004.135 It argues that the Enhanced Airline Passenger
Protection IIprovisions that went into effect in 2012 will improve
transparency, and more time is needed to see if consumer pro-
tection on the issue is still warranted."3 6 A4A argues that GDSs
have market power over airlines and cites examples where the
DOT has recognized this in the past.3 7 A4A explains that air-
lines use ancillary fee information as a negotiating tool for low-
ering the fee that airlines pay to the GDSs and technological
advancements of GDSs, both benefitting consumers. 3 A4A also
insists that market pressures for airlines to disclose ancillary fees
exist.'3 9 The incentive to disclose ancillary fee information de-
rives from airlines' interest in long-term customer loyalty and to
132 Kate Rice, Except for Southwest, Airlines Oppose Regulation of Fee Disclosure,
TRAVEL WEEKLY (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Air
line-News/Most-airlines-oppose-regulation-of-fee-disclosure/; see A4A Comment,
supra note 18; IATA Comment, supra note 19; AAA Travel, Comment Letter on
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees
and Other Consumer Protection Issues (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOT-OST-2014-0056-0686 [hereinafter AAA
Comment].
133 Rice, supra note 132.
134 Aviation Associations, AVIATION LAW BRIEF (2011), http://www.aviationlaw
brief.com/associations.html.
135 A4A Comment, supa note 18, at 5.
136 Id. at 13-14.
137 Id. at 2-3 (quoting Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 69
Fed. Reg. 976, 989 (Jan. 7, 2004) (codified at 14 C.F.R pt. 255) ("Each CRS there-
fore continues to have significant market power based on the travel agents to
which it has exclusive access.")).
138 Id. at 3-4.
139 Id. at 9.
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facilitate the sale of ancillary fees. 140 The comment demon-
strates how some third-party websites have gathered airlines' an-
cillary fee information, like smartertravel.com, and made such
information publicly available for comparison.
1 4 1
Additionally, A4A argues that basic ancillary fees are inciden-
tal and not intrinsic to air transportation. 142 It claims that many
customers choose to forgo these services to save money and that
such services are not a major factor in making ticket
purchases.143 In support of this argument, A4A cites the Internal
Revenue Code, which requires passengers to pay taxes on
airfares "for taxable transportation of any person. 1 1 44 But it does
not tax passengers on airfares for "transportation of baggage" or
any other "optional" service.
145
A4A insists that the DOT has miscalculated the cost-benefit
analysis.1 46 It notes that costs would include airlines' investments
in technological advancements for setting and displaying ancil-
lary fees and for developing and marketing ancillary bundles
and products.14 v A4A also claims that requiring ticket agents and
carriers to provide ancillary fee information on the first website
display screen would overwhelm, rather than assist, the cus-
tomer due to its irrelevancy and complexity.
1 48
As noted in A4A's comment, GDSs have indeed reduced their
fees to airlines during negotiations in exchange for full con-
tent.'49 In an article opposing the regulation, David Berg, the
Senior VP and General Counsel for A4A, argues that the rule
would "stifle innovation and competition in the distribution
market" by further strengthening the GDSs' market power.15 °
He notes that GDSs have not had any new entrants to the mar-
ket in over twenty-five years and that their market power has
140 Id.
141 Id. at 11.
142 Id. at 18.
143 Id. at 18-19.
- Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 4261 (a)).
145 Id. (quoting I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. at 7, 8, PLR-118216-09, No. 201002004,
2010 WL 147820 (Jan. 15, 2010)).
146 Id. at 21.
147 Id. at 22-23.
14 Id. at 24-25.
149 Jay Boehmer, GDS to Limit Agency Damages; Sabre, American Come to Terms,
Bus. TRAvEL NEws (Sept. 11, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.businesstravelnews.
com/article.aspx?id=8528&ida-airlines&a'btm.
150 David A. Berg, DOT's "Transparency ofAirline Ancillary Fees"Rulemaking Is Bad
Policy and Wrong on the Law, 27 No. 3 AIR & SPACE LAw. 3, 4 (2014).
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disincentivized innovation, thus leaving them with out-of-date
and inefficient technology.1 5 1
2. The International Air Transport Association
The IATA is a global trade association for air carriers, repre-
senting approximately 240 international airlines.15 2 In its com-
ment, the IATA explains that the DOT's authority to regulate
unfair and deceptive practices should be narrowly construed, in
order to adhere to Congress's deregulatory intent in the ADA.151
It argues that the DOT is exceeding its authority and that the
DOT has not evidenced any substantial injury to consumers
from current practices.1 54
The IATA uses several examples to illustrate how the airline
industry is already working towards higher transparency of air-
line fees; 55 it cites the New Distribution Capability (NDC).156
Indeed, the DOT has approved the NDC, a program to develop
and market a new XML data transmission standard that would
be available for use by any party.' 57 The new standard is de-
signed to customize ticket offers for consumers with different
combinations of ancillary services that would include a total
price. 15' About the program, the DOT said "the use of common
technical standards could facilitate the marketplace develop-
ment of distribution practices and channels that would make it
easier for consumers to compare competing carriers' fares and
ancillary products across multiple distribution channels, make
purchasing more convenient, allow carriers to customize service
151 Id.
152 IATA Comment, supra note 19, at 1; About Us, IATA, http://www.iata.org/
about/Pages/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
153 IATA Comment, supra note 19, at 6-8.
154 Id. at 11-12 ("Considering the fact that charges for bags and premium seat-
ing are a common industry practice-and that most consumers are aware that
fees are associated with these ancillary services-it is difficult to see how requir-
ing ticket agents to retrieve ancillary fee information on their own from readily
available public sources results in any concrete harm to consumers.").
155 Id. at 19.
156 Id. at 25.
157 IATA Welcomes US Dept. of Transportation Final Approval of Resolution 787,
IATA (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2014-08-07-
01.aspx; Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection
Issues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,970 (proposed May 23, 2014) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.
pt. 234, 244, 250, 255, 256, 257, 259, 399).
158 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Is-
sues, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29,976.
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and amenity offers and increase transparency, efficiency and
competition.' '1 59
3. AAA
Not every travel agency offers complete support to the rule
requiring airlines to disclose ancillary fee information to ticket
agents; AAA remains somewhat skeptical. 160 AAA is a not-for-
profit entity, one of North America's largest travel agencies, and
the largest travel and membership organization in North
America. 16 1 In a letter to the DOT in response to the NPRM,
AAA referenced Congress's intent to regulate the airline indus-
try when the ADA was passed in 1978.162 AAA emphasizes the
importance of keeping regulation consistent with the ADA's
concept of the superiority of competition to promote innova-
tion and low prices in the airline industry.'63 For this reason,
AAA "urges the Department to proceed with great care" in con-
sidering the proposal. 164
IV. ECONOMICS OF AIRLINE FARES
The U.S. airline industry struggled first in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001, and then during the recession in 2008 due
to high fuel prices and the financial crisis, but it has since re-
turned to profitability.1 65 Revenue growth has been essential to
the U.S. airline industry's improved financial health. 66 Accord-
ing to a 2014 Government Accountability Office report, this
growth has been aided by three main factors: (1) more passen-
gers; (2) limiting the supply of available seats in relation to de-
mand; and (3) revenue from ancillary fees. 167 Following the
recession, total operating revenue decreased by $22 billion from
2008 to 2009 but is now exceeding pre-recession levels and in-
creased 29% from 2009 to 2012.168
159 IATA Welcomes US Dept. of Transportation Final Approval of Resolution 787,
supra note 157.
160 See McDonald, supra note 97.




165 AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 5.





A. ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ANCILLARY FEES
1. Ancillary Fees Increasing Revenue
Prior to unbundling, airlines spread the cost of ancillary ser-
vices equally across all travelers as a part of their base airfare.'69
Unbundling the ancillary fees has been an effective strategy for
airlines, as they are able to keep the base fare low while allocat-
ing the additional costs on the specific customers who use the
optional services. 170 For instance, baggage checking is a costly
service for airlines, but not every customer uses that service, so
charging it as an ancillary fee imposes a cost proportional to the
actual cost of services that a customer wants. 17 1 But in some
cases the cost may be negligible, such as reserving a particular
seat on an aircraft.' 72 Some passengers place higher value on
this service, and so they are willing to pay a higher price while
others are not.17 This enables airlines to increase revenue and
differentiate their brand by offering enhanced products for
minimal cost. 174 For example, a recent study found that when
airlines introduced bag fees in 2008, base fares fell by about 3%,
but the total cost of travel was higher for those who used the
service. 175 However, consumers paid on average about 4% more
for airfares in 2012 than in 2007, without considering additional
fees, most likely due to an improved economy and increased
demand. 176
Although revenue from ancillary fees is still small in propor-
tion to total airline operating revenue, it is growing: according
to a Government Accountability Office report in 2010, the reve-
nues from baggage fees, reservation change fees, and cancella-
tion fees have grown from less than 1% of operating revenues in
2007 to over 4% in 2009.177 From 2009 to 2010, airline revenue
from baggage, reservation changes, and cancellation fees in-
169 Id. at 17.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 34.
172 Id.
173 Id. 34-35.
174 Id. at 34.
175 Id. at 35.
176 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTmILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-785, COMMERCIAL AVIATION:
CONSUMERS COULD BENEFIT FROM BErTTER INFORMATION ABOUT AIRLINE-IMPOSED
FEES AND REFUNDABILITY OF GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED TAXES AND FEES 32 (2010),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10785.pdf [hereinafter COMMERCIAL
AVIATION].
177 Id. at 11.
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creased 13%.178 2014 was a record setting year for add-on fee
revenues, with U.S. airlines collecting $6 billion in baggage and
reservation fees.' 79 In fact, some data suggests that without reve-
nue from ancillary fees, some airlines would not be profitable.'
When Air Canada and WestJet Airlines announced their plans to
charge checked baggage fees, both. companies' stock rose on the
day of these announcements. 8 1
Discount airlines such as Allegiant Air and Spirit that offer
cheap base airfares receive a more considerable portion of their
operating revenues from ancillary fees. 182 For example, Spirit's
revenue from checked baggage and change fees grew from 3%
to 15% of total operating revenues between 2008 and 2012.183
However, the total revenue from ancillary fees is unclear, be-
cause airlines are only required to report to the DOT their
checked baggage and reservation change fees; other fees are in-
cluded in a variety of other revenue accounts. 8 4
2. Ancillary Fees Decreasing Customer Satisfaction
On the other hand, customers have become increasingly frus-
trated by airlines "nickel and diming" them with the use of
sometimes-hidden fees, and this could affect their willingness to
purchase tickets from those airlines in the future. Research sug-
gests that consumers' attitudes toward brands that use add-on
pricing are more negative than those that disclose full price,
making consumers less likely to purchase from those brands in
the future. 85 Whether consumers view the add-on fees as rea-
sonable is an important factor in determining whether the fees
will affect their brand attitude. 86 Presentation of the fees is also
an important factor. 87 Presenting the total price after the addi-
178 Id.
179 U.S. Airlines Rake in $6B in Add-on Fees, CBC NEWS (May 14, 2013, 12:46 PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/u-s-airlines-rake-in-6b-in-add-on-fees-1.1356
632.




182 COMMERCIAL AVIATION, supra note 176, at 18.
183 AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 18.
184 COMMERCIAL AVIATION, supra note 176, at 16.
185 Vicki Morwitz et al., The Price Does Not Include Additional Taxes, Fees, and
Surcharges: A Review of Research on Partitioned Pricing, 24-25 (Oct. 19, 2013), http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1350004.
186 Id. at 25-26.
187 Id. at 37.
770
AIRLINE ANCILLARY FEES
tional fees can mitigate the effects of consumers feeling cheated
by the brand.1 88 However, when extra fees are less visibly salient,
in particular those shown in a smaller font size, customers un-
derestimate the total cost, leading to short-term benefits.8 But
there is a higher likelihood they will eventually be surprised by
the total cost, thus creating a negative impact on future
purchases.190
An example of the brand attitude effect of add-on fees is ap-
parent with Southwest Airlines, the outlier of the airline industry
with its "bags fly free" mantra. Southwest was the top stock of
2014, with increases that topped 110%, beating out all of its
competitors. 9 ' It ranked second in airline customer satisfaction
only to JetBlue, according to the American Customer Satisfac-
tion Index.192
B. OTHER IMPORTANT COSTS AFFECTING PRICE OF AIRFARE
It is impossible to look at costs affecting airfare without con-
sidering the price of fuel. Rising fuel prices have presented ma-
jor challenges in the airline industry because fuel accounts for
nearly half of an airline's total costs. 193 Airlines took numerous
steps to deal with the rising fuel prices between 2002 and
2013.' During that period, jet fuel prices quadrupled from
$0.72 to $2.98 per gallon and gasoline prices for aviation tripled
from $1.29 to $3.93 per gallon. 19 However, very recently there
has been a fall in fuel prices.'9 6 Although this has been a relief
for airlines, economic experts predict that this savings will not
be reflected in ticket fares. 19 7 This may be because airlines have
188 Id. at 26.
189 Id. at 18.
190 Id.
191 Jesse Solomon, Southwest Airlines: Top Stock of 2014, CNN MONEY (Nov. 18,
2014, 1:31 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/18/investing/southwest-air
lines-best-stock-2014/.
192 Id.
193 Jad Mouawad & Nicola Clark, Slide in Fuel Costs Lifts Profits for Airlines, but
Fares Won't Fall, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/
11 /business/side-in-fue-costs-ifts-profits-for-airlines-but-fares-wont-fall.html?-r
=0.
194 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABIITY OFFICE, GAO-14-311, AVIATION: IMPACT OF FUEL
PRICE INCREASES ON THE AVIATION INDUSTRY (2014), http://www.gao.gov/pro
ducts/GAO-14-331.
195 Id.
196 Mouawad & Clark, supra note 193.
197 Id.
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little incentive to reduce their fares, partially because of the lu-
crative ancillary fees. 198
In addition to fuel price issues, government-imposed fees and
taxes have increased. As mentioned earlier, government-im-
posed taxes and fees now make up about 20% of the total price
of airfare. 9 For instance, ticket fees pay for construction
projects at airports, called passenger facility charges °.2 0 There is
a federal cap on these fees currently set at $4.50 for each takeoff
and landing.2 1' These fees generate $2.8 billion a year, but air-
ports argue the fees have not kept pace with inflation. 2 There
is a contentious proposal to raise the cap to $8.2 °3 Raising the
cap is troubling to airlines, because a Government Accountabil-
ity Office study in 2012 found that a $3 increase in security fees
on airline tickets could result in a 1% decline in customers.20 4
V. ANALYSIS
A. THE QUANDARY OF REREGULATION OF THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Although the DOT undoubtedly has the authority to prevent
airlines from unfair and deceptive practices, the extent to which
it can intervene into the airline industry's marketing and distri-
bution practices remains unresolved.205 The spirit of the ADA,
that "maximum reliance on competitive market forces would
best further efficiency, innovation and low prices as well as vari-
ety and quality of air transportation services," is certainly called
into question by the current NPRM and other recent consumer
protection rules regulating the airline industry.206 As shown by
other rules, the consequences of such regulations can often be
unexpected and inadvertently impose more harm on consum-
198 Id.
199 Nick Calio, Expose Airfare Taxes: Opposing View, USA TODAY (Apr. 30, 2014,
8:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/04/30/transparent-
airfares-act-airlines-for-america-editorials-debates/8537815/.
200 Bart Jansen, Airports, Airlines Disagree About Raising Ticket Fees, USA TODAY






205 SeeYoung & Grunewald, supra note 23, at 1, 14.
206 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (quoting 49
U.S.C. app. §§ 1302(a)(4), 1302(a)(9)).
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ers. 21 7 The requirement that there be "compelling evidence" of
consumer harm to issue such regulations seems to have been
relaxed by recent rules.2 8 The Supreme Court, under the gui-
dance of the ADA, looked at frequent flyer miles programs in
Northwest and found that the market provided sufficient protec-
tion: "If an airline acquires a reputation for mistreating the par-
ticipants in its frequent flyer program.., customers can avoid
that program and may be able to enroll in a more favorable pro-
gram. '209 Likewise, here the customers can protect themselves
by finding the ancillary information on the airline's website or
simply purchasing from airlines that they find to be more
straightforward in their marketing and services. 210
The ASTA's argument that the DOT must zealously prevent
unfair and deceptive practices in the airline industry, because
the ADA made the DOT the sole enforcement authority
through federal preemption, is misguided. 21 The purpose of
ADA preemption of state law is to "prevent states from hamper-
ing competition by reimposing similar regulation," not to create
extensive federal regulation.21 2 Additionally, the "saving" clause
of the ADA leaves remedies at common law and statute in place,
and section 1305 of the ADA only preempts state law "related to
rates, routes, and services. '213 In this instance, the NPRM, if en-
acted, would stifle innovation and produce less variety of air
transportation services, falling short of the stated goal of the
ADA.
B. AN INDUSTRY-BASED SOLUTION
The claim that airlines have no market incentive to display
ancillary fees is false. With the growing disgruntlement of con-
sumers who feel duped by the "hidden fees," airlines can in-
207 See Levin, supra note 36.
208 See Petition for Rulemaking of Joel Kaufman Re Ticket Change Penalties,
supra note 22, at 1.
209 Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1433 (2014).
210 See IATA Comment, supra note 19, at 12.
211 See ASTA Comment, supra note 98, at 6.
212 Sedigh v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 197, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see
Koutsouradis v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 427 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005).
213 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1305(a) (1), 1506; see Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
867 F. Supp. 214, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Given that Congress did not repeal
§ 1506, I do not accept United's argument that § 1305 preempts all state tort
actions. Adopting the result urged by United would leave injured plaintiffs with-
out a remedy in situations where outrageous and unnecessary conduct occurred
during the performance of a service.").
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crease customer satisfaction and brand loyalty with more
transparent display of their extra fees.214 The airlines' interest in
building customer loyalty is evidenced by their development of
frequent flyer programs. 15 The success of Southwest's "bags fly
free" policy and positive brand attributions by consumers exem-
plifies the manifest market incentives of such policies. 6 For in-
stance, after one airline adopted a frequent flyer-like program, it
quickly became an industry standard in order to compete. 17
The airline industry is certainly ripe for incentives to increase
brand loyalty, as it has been rapidly declining for the past eight
years i.2 1 Additionally, the success of Southwest suggests that the
airline industry's improvement in revenue can be attributed to
an improved economy and consolidation of the industry over
the rise in ancillary fees.
Even if airlines do not adopt a policy partially eliminating an-
cillary fees like Southwest, there is still a market incentive to pro-
vide this information to GDSs.2 19 Aside from improving
customer satisfaction and brand attitude, the highly-desired in-
formation is an important negotiating tool for airlines that has
proven effective in lowering fees and thus total cost to the con-
sumer.22 0 Indeed, Open Allies concedes in its comment that "a
number of bi-lateral agreements to distribute ancillary services
have been announced between individual airlines and individ-
ual GDSs in recent years. '22 1 Illustrating that airlines do not
have an abusive level of market power, profit margins for indus-
try are low when compared to most other industries.22 Al-
though proponents for the rule argue that ancillary fees reduce
downward pressure on airfare prices, the airline industry has in-
creased the variety of air transportation available in recent
years. 223 Despite the recent major airline mergers, the number
214 See A4A CommeAt, supra note 18, at 9.
215 See Nancy Trejos, Travelers Get Stingier with Their Loyalty, USA TODAY (Jan. 19,
2013, 3:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/2013/01/18/airline-ho
tel-loyalty-programs-survey/ 1566420/.
216 See Solomon, supra note 191.
217 See Trejos, supra note 215.
218 See Brett Snyder, Forrester Says Leisure Travel Brand Loyalty Disappearing Rap-
idly, CBS MONEYWATCH (Dec. 15, 2008, 11:48 AM,), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/forrester-says-leisure-travel-brand-loyalty-disappearing-rapidly/; Trejos,
supra note 215.
219 See A4A Comment, supra note 18, at 3-4.
220 Id.
221 Open Allies Comment, supra note 25, at 6.
222 AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 5.
223 See Open Allies Comment, supra note 25, at 6.
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of competitors has not considerably changed and the growing
market of discount airlines has increased. 24 With incentives for
this information to be released by both GDSs and airlines, an
industry-based solution, such as the NDC, would allow for a mar-
ket efficient compromise by the two players.
Airlines' reliance on ancillary fees for revenues and the public
condemnation on hidden fees is a recent phenomenon, and
given time the industry will react. In its comment, Open Allies
adequately showed that ancillary fees surprised a majority of air-
line travelers. 25 However, with any implementation of a new in-
dustry standard affecting cost upwardly, consumers will likely
feel surprised and aggrieved. Additionally, a deceptive practice
is "likely to mislead," not merely has a "tendency and capacity to
mislead. '221 Without allowing time for the airline industry to
adapt and react to the new economic realities, the proposal is
premature. For instance, with airlines like Spirit getting in-
creased media scrutiny for their baggage fee policies, the re-
ported instances of customers feeling surprised or deceived by
the post-purchase fee will inevitably fall.2 7 Thus, the argument
that ancillary fees constitute unfair and deceptive practices will
fall accordingly.2 28
VI. CONCLUSION
After struggling in the recession, the airline industry has cre-
atively innovated its business model and invested substantially in
doing so.229 These innovative tactics have enabled the industry
to survive the recession and emerge financially strong.2 ° Be-
cause the current NPRM is a broad interpretation of DOT's au-
thority under the "unfair and deceptive" practices provision,
and likewise antagonistic to Congress's intent to deregulate the
airline industry with the ADA, such a rule requires "compelling
evidence" and clear harm to consumers. Until the after-effects
of hidden fees (increasing negative brand attitude and increas-
ing public scrutiny) are actualized by the airline industry, we
224 Id. at 10.
225 Id. at 2.
226 Sw. Sunsites, Inc. v. F.T.C., 785 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986).
227 SeeJack Nicas, Thriftiest Fliers Outwit Fee Hungry Airlines, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23,
2013, 5:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023046071045792
14260795108536.
228 See Open Allies Survey, supra note 4.
2- See AIRLINE COMPETITION, supra note 5.
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cannot exhaustively examine the market incentives for airlines
to make them more transparent. When these market incentives
can be implemented in negotiations and the ramifications of in-
dustry-based solutions are realized, and there still consists a mar-
ket failure, the time for a regulatory solution may be ripe. Until
then, the proposed rules are premature.
